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This paper analyses the impact of foreign health aid on the emigration rates of physicians. We
use a panel database to investigate the emigration of physicians from 192 source countries to 17
destination countries between 1995 and 2004. First, we investigate the direct impact of health
assistance using the generalised method of moments (GMM) and highlight a signi￿cant negative
e￿ect of foreign health assistance on the medical brain drain. Moreover, we analyse whether this
e￿ect of health aid is more e￿ective in a context of good governance. We ￿nd that health aid is
more e￿ective at reducing physicians’ emigration rates when the levels of corruption and in￿ation
are low.
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11 Introduction
In 1965, there were 75 million migrants globally (or 2% of the world population), while in 2000, the
number of migrants was around 175 million, which corresponds to 3% of the world population (United
Nations (2001)). In developing countries, Docquier et al. (2007) have found that the average emigration
between 1990 and 2000 rose from 1.6% to 1.8%. The consequences of globalisation seem to a￿ect trade,
capital ￿ows, foreign direct investments but not really migration. However, the structure of interna-
tional migration has changed quickly over time. The stock of skilled migrants in OECD countries has
increased by 64% between 1990 and 2000, whereas the growth of total immigrants in OECD countries
was only 23%. During the same period, the proportion of skilled among immigrants has increased from
30% to 35%. Low-income countries (93%) like Sub-Saharan Africa (113%) and small countries (up to
97%) are the most a￿ected by skilled emigration (Docquier et al. (2008)).
The ￿gures on total skilled migration include all occupational categories, such as engineer, professor,
computer scientist and biologist. In this study we only focus on physicians. As a form of skilled mi-
gration, the emigration of physicians from developing countries to developed countries is an increasing
phenomenom. In 2000, foreign-trained practising physicians represented 21.4% of the total workforce
of physicians in Australia, 30.4% in United Kingdom and 34.5% in New Zealand (Forcier et al. (2004)).
In 2002, 23% of physicians in Canada were trained abroad, and 24% in the US were trained overseas
(Astor et al. (2005)). The proportion of physicians in di￿erent countries coming from middle-income
and low-income countries is not well known due to the lack of data, but, for example, in the USA, 64%
of foreign-born physicians are from these regions (Hagopian et al. (2004)).
This phenomenon is of signi￿cant importance for OECD countries for several reasons:
 Developed countries face an aging population that is and will continue to be major consumers of
health and medical services in the future (OECD (2008a)).
 In OECD countries, a decline in the number of children per woman leads to a reduction in
the number of new students in medicine and ultimately to a future reduction in the number of
new physicians and new health workers. Moreover, the medical education system in developed
countries is unable to create a su￿cient number of medical workers given the shortage observed
in the medical labour market. As previously mentioned, the "numerus clausus" is ￿xed and does
not take into account the needs of the population for health care and the future replacement of
doctors during the next year (OECD (2008a)).
2This gap between health demand and health supply has pushed developed countries to host medical
workers and to compete with other developed countries for the recruitment of health care workers from
all over the world. Because globalisation has increased the interactions between countries, developing
countries may face emigration in the health care sector, which in turn may cause an increasing shortage
of medical workers in these countries (Cooper (2004) and OECD (2008a)).
The literature on the consequences of health on human development and economic outcomes is well
known (Bhargava et al. (2001)). Nevertheless, the impact of this emigration on health outcomes in the
source countries is very controversial. By compiling a new dataset on health professional emigration
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Clemens and Petterson (2008)), Clemens (2007) found that the emigration of
medical doctors does not explain the low sta￿ng of medical workers, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In contrast, OECD (2008b) and World Health Organisation (2006) have observed that shortages of
healthcare professionals in receiving OECD countries drive the immigration of physicians coming from
developing countries which explains the low levels of sta￿ng in Africa, for example. Thus, the lower is
the number of physicians per 1000 people, the higher is the immigration rate of physicians into OECD
countries. Moreover, a survey on physician migration in Pakistan, Nigeria and the Phillipines reveals
that more than 50% of respondents agree with that physician emigration has led to an insu￿cient
number of physicians necessary to meet the health care needs of the local population and thus has not
helped to build the health system (Astor et al. (2005)).
In the same way, Bhargava and Docquier (2008) ￿nd that doubling the emigration of physicians accross
African countries leads to an increase of 20% in the death rate due to HIV when the HIV prevalence
rate is above 3%. This ￿nding is particularly worrisome for the achievement of the Millenium Develop-
ment Goals in the health sector. One goal is to reduce the under-￿ve mortality rate by two thirds by
2015, while another focuses on improving maternal health. The last target is to ￿ght against epidemics
such as HIV-AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (United Nations (2008)). Thus, professional health care
is important to improve the health population and to attain these targets by 2015.
When the international community adopted the Millenium Development Goals in 2000, one of the
tools suggested to attain these objectives was to increase the O￿cial Development Assistance (ODA)
aimed to developing countries. Signi￿cantly, in 2005, the ODA was increased to the threshold of $100
billion. O￿cial Development Assistance, particularly in the health sector, has the goal of increasing
infrastructure such as new hospitals, more medicines, treatments and drugs, vaccination programs, pre-
vention campaign and new equipment. However, because the number of health workers, particularly
3doctors and nurses, is not su￿cient, especially in rural and less wealthier areas (Dussault and Frances-
chini (2006)), access to these health care services remains limited. Increases in the health infrastructure
should be accompanied with an increase in health professionals in order to improve the quality of health
in developing countries.
One of the possible tools that OECD countries can easily use to manage migration ￿ows involve
the incentives tied to the o￿cial health aid from donors to recipients countries. In fact, health aid may
have a potential impact on health infrastructure, which plays a key role in the improvement of the
working conditions for health professionals. Even if theoretical research exists on the link between aid
and migration (Gaytan-Fregoso and Lahiri (2000) and Schi￿ (1994)), due to the lack of data on migra-
tion, this question has not been addressed empirically except by BerthØlØmy et al. (2008). However,
this study focuses on general migration, whereas we analyse this correlation speci￿cally in the health
sector. Thus, the contribution of this paper is double.
 First, important policy implications are presented with respect to the impact of foreign health
assistance on the medical brain drain. Do international migration of labour and foreign aid in
the health sector act as complements or substitutes? If they are complements, then aid is a great
tool to reduce physician emigration by improving medical working conditions, whereas if they are
substitutes, then aid gives incentives to so-called "Southern" physicians to migrate. Our paper
estimates empirically the e￿ect of health-related foreign aid on medical brain drain by using a
new database on the medical brain drain (Bhargava and Docquier (2008)) that enables panel
analysis.
 Second, Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Dollar and Svensson (2000) have noted that foreign aid
has no impact on economic growth except in countries in which governance and macroeconomic
policies are quite good. Even though our dependent variable is di￿erent, our analysis follows
this framework and evaluates in which political environnements health aid is more e￿ective in
reducing emigration rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides stylised facts on the medical brain drain
and aid evolution in the health sector. Section 3 then presents the empirical model. Section 4 presents
estimation strategies. Section 5 reports the ￿ndings from estimating the generalised method of moment
for medical brain drain and health aid, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
42 Data and descriptive statistics
The medical brain drain dataset covers emigration from 192 source countries to 16 OECD destination
countries and one non-OECD country from 1991 to 2004. These 16 OECD destination countries in-
clude Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In a new version
of the database, Bhargava and Docquier (2007) added South Africa as a new non-OECD destination
country and corrected the emigration rates for the presence or absence of medical schools in the origin
countries. Data by country of training is available for the most important destination countries repre-
senting 75% of our sample (Bhargava and Docquier (2007)) 1. Our analysis is based on this updated
database and focuses on the time period between 1995 and 2004 2. Moreover, because the health aid
received by countries may have an impact on migration regardless of the donor, our study focuses
exclusively on aggregate health ￿ows by recipient countries 3.
The medical brain drain rate is de￿ned by the following equation:
MBDi;t = Mi;t=(Pi;t + Mi;t)
Note that Mi;t is de￿ned as the stock of physicians from country i working abroad at time t , and
Pi;t is the number of physicians working in their home country i at time t.
The O￿cial Development Assistance(ODA) database on the health sector is extracted from the
Country Reporting System (CRS) database, which is provided by the Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Health sector
assistance includes assistance to hospitals and clinics, assistance to specialised institutions such as those
for tuberculosis, maternal and child care, other medical and dental services, disease and epidemic con-
trol, vaccination programmes, nursing, the provision of drugs, health demonstrations, public health
administration and medical insurance programmes. In our case, we also include the population sector
in our measure of health aid, including programs devoted to the control of sexually transmitted diseases
and HIV-AIDS activities such as communication, screening, prevention, treatment and care. Popula-
tion aid also includes prenatal and perinatal care, including childbirth and the training of medical
workers for health service delivery. Henceforth in this paper, we de￿ne the foreign aid given to the
1Compared with world migration, all these destination countries attract around 44% of all international migrants.
2Health aid data is not available before this time.
3In addition, bilateral aid is better reported than multilateral aid in health sector, that is why our analysis uses only
aggregate bilateral aid.
5health and population sectors as health aid.
In our analysis, we focus only on health aid commitments as expressed in constant 2007 dollars rather
than disbursements 4. Moreover, a large part of the CRS database is composed of missing data in the
health sector. This may indicate that a donor has not given any health aid in the given period, or that a
donor has given health aid but it has not been reported, or that a country registered all health aid given
to the recipient country at one time rather than annually reported over the time period. Therefore,
these missing data are dropped from the analysis rather than considered as zero health aid. As is com-
mon in the foreign aid literature (Boone (1996) and Alesina and Dollar (2000)), our health aid variable
is expressed as the average of health aid over the three years prior to the date when emigration occured.
The analysis of the level of medical brain drain and health development aid in recipient countries
reveals many interesting ￿gures (see Table 1).
 First, small countries (below 2.5 million people) are most a￿ected by the medical brain drain.
For example, in 2004, the average rate of medical brain drain in these countries was around 15%.
One possible explanation is that the absorption capacity of these countries is quite limited by
their geographic area, and the supply of physicians exceeds the local demand. Thus emigration
has been seen as the way to get a job. Medical brain drain is a decreasing function of population
level. Concerning health aid, small countries receive more health aid than large countries such
as Boone (1996), Alesina and Dollar (2000) and BerthØlØmy (2003) have found. In our case,
countries with small populations receive more than 50% of the total health aid distributed. Even
if this distribution is strongly assymetric as compared with large countries, the health aid received
by small countries shows a diminishing trend (-17.7% between 1995 and 2004). Around 20% of
health aid is given to lower-middle populated countries (population between 2.5 and 10 million),
whereas upper-middle countries (population between 10 and 25 million) received 25.4% of health
aid. A rebalancing process seems to be taking place, as the amount of health aid received by
upper-middle and large countries (over 25 million people) has almost doubled between 1995 and
2004.
4Disbursements are underreported as compared to commitments and thus do not provide enough data for an econo-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7 Second, low-income countries face a high emigration rate for health sta￿. This rate increased from
6.2% in 1995 to 7.2% in 2004. This phenomenom is quite worrisome because it is in this part of the
world that the number of physicians per 1,000 people is the lowest at approximately one physician
per 1,000 people. Sub-Saharan Africa is the most a￿ected region in the world. For example, in
2004, the number of physicians for 1,000 people was 0.16, but the emigration rate of physicians was
equal to 19%. World Health Organisation (2006) stipulates that number of physicians per 1,000
people must be equal to 2.5 to deliver a minimum level of skilled birth attendance and measles
immunisation to the population. These huge out￿ows of health professionals from developing
countries can alter the e￿ciency of the health provision system at the expense of the population,
especially the poor rural population (Dussault and Franceschini (2006)). Health aid has the same
distribution as the emigration of physicians. Low-income countries are the biggest recipients of
health aid. In 2004, they received 66.3% of the total health aid committed. This is good mainly
for Sub-Saharan Africa, which is relatively favoured as a recipient for health aid. What it is
surprising is the presence of high-income countries among the recipient countries of health aid.
These countries includes Carribean islands and Middle Eastern countries that are classi￿ed as
high-income countries, either due to their low populations or due to the presence of oil resources,
but they face many di￿culties in their human development processes.
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8Figure 1 represents the evolution of total O￿cial Development Assistance (ODA) commitment in
the health sector. From 1995 to 2004, health aid accounted for a steadily increasing proportion of
global ODA (from 6% to 8%) across all sectors (except in 2003). This increasing proportion can be
explained by the adoption of the Millenium Development Goals in 2000, which induced donors to in-
crease their amount of foreign aid, particularly the part devoted to education and health, in order to
achieve the objectives related to poverty and epidemic reduction in the health sector by 2015. In term
of the total volume, health aid increased from 2 billion dollars in 1995 to almost 5 billion dollars in 2004,
which represents a huge increase of 150%. The distinction between aid devoted to the health sector and
that devoted to the population sector reveals that population aid rose quickly as compared to health aid.
In 1995, aid devoted to the population sector represented one third of the amount of aid devoted
to the health sector; in 2004 it attained the level of two thirds. This evolution can be explained by the
huge explosion of HIV-AIDS epidemics during these years, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, where
prevention campaigns and HIV treatments have been heavily ￿nanced.
In our study, other data is used as explanatory variables as controls. GDP per capita (PPP) is
expressed in constant 2000 dollars. The HIV prevalence rate is expressed in the percentage of the af-
fected population aged between 15-49 years old, and the net secondary school enrollment is expressed in
percentages of population. These data are extracted from the 2008 World Development Indicators from
the World bank. Data on our dependent variable for physician wages, expressed in terms of average
wages in the United States, are provided by International Labour Organization (2005) (see also Freeman
and Oostendorp (2000) regarding the Occupational Wage Around the World database (OWW). The
corruption variable is extracted from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG (2004)) database.
The corruption index varies from 0 to 6 points, where higher points mean that the level of corruption
is low, and lower points mean that corruption is high. This index measures all kinds of bribes related
to exchanges control, trade licences, police protection, and favoritism that mixes politics with business.
In an extended speci￿cation, we use the Law and Order index to measure the strength and impartiality
of the judicial system as well as the observance of the law. As before, the higher is the index, the lower
is the risk. Finally, trade openess is de￿ned as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services
as a share of GDP, and in￿ation is measured by the consumer price index, which re￿ects the annual
percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services.
These last two variables are also extracted from the 2008 World Development Indicators.
Given these facts, health aid and the medical emigration rate seem to be positively correlated, as
9health aid seems to be higher in the regions that are most a￿ected by physician emigration rates.
Nevertheless, these stylised facts must be interpreted with caution for several reasons.
 First, the correlation does not control for other factors such as population and development level.
The correlation may be spurious if there is any factor that simultaneously in￿uences emigration
and aid in the health sector. For example, Bhargava and Docquier (2008) have underlined the
role of HIV-AIDS in medical emigration but it could also a￿ect health aid.
 Second, the apparent positive correlation provides no information on the causality between the
variables of medical emigration and health aid. Is health aid in￿uencing the distribution of
physician emigration rates, or the reverse?
For this reason, the next section investigates this correlation using di￿erent econometric approaches
to take these biases into account.
3 The Econometric Model
We analyse the e￿ect of foreign aid in the health sector on the medical brain drain. We follow the
speci￿cations of Bhargava and Docquier (2008) by adding foreign health assistance. Our variable of
interest, health aid, is the average ￿ow of health aid received by countries over the last 3 years, whereas
the dependant variable is the emigration rate of physicians calculated from the stock of physicians’
out￿ows. In order to obtain a model in which the ￿ows of physicians is explained by the ￿ows of health
assistance, we transformed the initial model of Bhargava and Docquier (2008) in order to obtain a
dependent variable that measures variations in the emigration rate of physicians.
The equation of the model is as follows:
Ln(MBDit=MBDit 1) = 0 + 1Ln(MBDit 1) + 2Ln(Physicians   wages=USA   ratio)it 1
+ 3Ln(GDP   per   capita)it 1 + 4Ln(School   enrollment   secondary)it 1
+ 5Ln(HIV   prevalence   rate)it 1 + 6ln(Aidi;t 1;t 3) + uit
(1)
10Note that(i) is the country of origin, and (t) is the year.
MBDi;t is the emigration rate of physicians from home country (i) at time (t) and MBDi;t 1 is the
rate at time t-1. In our case, MBDit=MBDit 1 expresses the growth of the physician emigration rate
between t and t-1, but because we control the initial conditions MBDi;t 1, on the right-hand side, the
dependent variable captures the change between the rates from time t to t-1. The variable MBDi;t 1
can be interpreted as a "catching-up" e￿ect, which is widely used in economic growth models. In
other word, the higher is the initial level of migration rate, the lower will be the migration growth
rate. Two variables are de￿ned as endogeneous in this model, namely, the initial level of medical brain
drain MBDi;t 1 and the health aid variable Aidi;t 1t 3. This latter variable is the average of aid ￿ow
from t-1 to t-3, as commonly used in the aid literature (see Boone (1996) and Alesina and Dollar (2000)).
In order to know whether health aid has di￿erent impacts depending on macroeconomic policy
or institutional quality, we interact the health aid variable with an index that captures the economic
environnement and instutional risk. Burnside and Dollar (1998) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) have
established that a good policy environment with low in￿ation rates, high levels of openness and low
governement de￿cits 5 (or high surplus) is a necessary condition for the e￿ectiveness of aid. In Table 4,
we check if this result is valid for health aid. Dollar and Svensson (2000) have shown that the success
or failure of structural adjustement programs is strongly related to the quality of institutions involved
in a country. We follow these papers by interacting our variable of interest with policy variables (i.e.,
corruption, law, trade openess and in￿ation) 6.
The model with the interaction term is similar to the previous one:
Ln(MBDit=MBDit 1) = 0 + 1Ln(MBDit 1) + 2Ln(Physicians   wages=USA   ratio)it 1
+ 3Ln(GDP   per   capita)it 1 + 4Ln(School   enrollment   secondary)it 1
+ 5Ln(HIV   prevalence   rate)it 1 + 6Ln(Aidi;t 1;t 3)
+ 7Ln(Policy)it 1 + 8[Ln(Aidi;t 1;t 3)  Ln(Policy)it 1] + uit (2)
5This variable is not adequately reported in WDI 2008, which prevents GMM estimation.
6Because of insu￿cient data on the surplus and de￿cit variable, we cannot estimate this interaction empirically.
11Note that Ln(Policy)it 1 represents respectively the level of corruption, the rule of law, the degree
of openess and the in￿ation rate 7. The corruption index is scaled between 0 and 6. Note that trans-
forming it into logarithmic form would drop the data for which the index is 0. We therefore take the
logarithm of (1 + variable) to preserve the same distribution. We have done the same thing for the law
and order index 8. In Equation 2, the interaction term is assumed to be endogenous, as are the initial
values of the medical brain drain and the health aid variable.
All variables in all speci￿cations are expressed in logarithmic form and interpreted as elasticities 9.
The error term ui;t in both equations can be decomposed as follows:
uit = i + t + it (3)
Note that i represents the country-speci￿c ￿xed e￿ect (i) common to all years (t), t corresponds
to the time-speci￿c ￿xed e￿ect (t) common to all countries (i), and it is the error term, which is
assumed to be log-normally distributed.
4 The Econometric Framework
Our study begins with a ￿xed-e￿ect analysis in which we control for country-speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects and
time dummies . This technique has the advantage that it can control for unobservable characteristics
speci￿c to countries that are not included in the estimation. It reduces the potential bias of ommited
variables, which are commonly one of many sources of endogeneity problems. Nevertheless, a ￿xed-
e￿ect analysis in the presence of dynamic panels could lead to biased estimation (Nickell (1981)).
Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a generalised method of moment in di￿erence, which consists of
tranforming the model into the ￿rst di￿erence equation and correcting the endogeneous variables by
their lagged values. For example, consider the following equation:
Yit = 1Yit 1 + 2Xit + uit
uit = i + it
(4)
7Because in￿ation is the growth from t-1 to t, we keep the variable as it is, whereas all other policy variables are
lagged by one period because of stocks.
8We initially incorporated the population into the estimation; however, it is always insigni￿cant in our estimation,
and so we dropped this variable from our model.
9We remove the e￿ect of outliers from all estimations by employing the "‘hadimvo"’ process at 5 percent.
12Note that Yit is the dependent variable, Yit 1 is its lag, Xit is the exogeneous variable (possibly
including its lagged value), and uit is the error term for the ￿xed e￿ect i.
Then, the GMM di￿erence transforms this equation by the ￿rst di￿erence:
Yit   Yit 1 = 1[Yit 1   Yit 2] + 2[Xit   Xit 1] + [uit   uit 1] (5)
In the previous equation, the instrument used in this equation was Yit 2 because it is correlated
with the di￿erence in the dependent variable but not with the di￿erence in the error term. If we




E[(Xit)  (Uit)] = 0
(6)
Bond et al. (2001) have noted the problem of weak instruments associated with this method, which
led Blundell and R.Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover (1995) to develop an updated method called
the system GMM. It consists of an estimation of the same ￿rst-di￿erencing equation presented above
and an added level equation in which the instruments are the ￿rst di￿erences in the lagged variables.
The orthogonality conditions, thus, become
E[Yit 1  (Uit)] = 0-for-t = 2;:::;T (7)
The validity of the instruments and moment conditions is tested using the Hansen J test and the
AR(1) and AR(2) conditions. However, Roodman (2007) underlines the problem of having too many
instruments in the GMM estimation. He demonstrates that even if the instruments are individually
valid, they can be invalid collectively so that the overidentifying Hansen J Test is insu￿cient to check
the instrument’s robusteness. One of solutions is to limit the number of instruments in the analysis
such that the number of groups always exceeds the number of instruments. In our paper, we have used
the system GMM and controlled for the number of instruments involved in our analysis.
In our system of GMM estimation, we used lags over three years for our endogeneous variable
(MBDi;t 1 and Aidi;t 1t 3) and the exogeneity of other variables as the instruments. We use only
lags over two years or one year when we entered the interaction term into the estimation so as to avoid
introducing too many instruments.
13Finally, the system GMM permits us to resolve the problem of endogenity for health aid without
using strictly external instruments, which are hard to ￿nd in our case.
5 Empirical Results
In this section, the results obtained through ￿xed-e￿ect estimation are presented in Table 2, followed
by the results based on GMM estimation in Table 3 in order to address endogeneity problem. The
impact of health aid could be di￿erent according to institutional quality and macroeconomic policy,
and so Table 4 presents regression with interaction terms.
5.1 Estimation without interaction terms
Table 2 presents the panel ￿xed-e￿ect estimation of physician emigration rates (column 1); we then
add the health aid variable (column 2). In columns 3 and 4, the level of corruption is added as well as
the in￿ation rate. Then, Table 3 presents the GMM estimation with the same structure.
The initial emigration rate of physicians is robust accross estimations, regardless of the method
adopted. This coe￿cient is, as expected, signi￿cant and negative. This variable can be interpreted
as a convergence to country speci￿c stationnary equilibrium. The lower the initial emigration rate is,
the higher is the growth of the physician rate in the next year. This means that the emigration rate
approaches a long-term equilibrium, and the coe￿cient associated with these variable permits us to
calculate the long-term e￿ect of all other explanatory variables. In the ￿rst column of Table 3, the ini-
tial level of the emigration rate in the health sector, which is endogeneous, is negative but insigni￿cant.
In this column, we use the lags over ￿ve periods as internal instruments. However, when we introduce
health aid as endogeneous in column 2, the convergence become signi￿cantly negative at the 10% level
with a value of -0.076. It con￿rms the previous result obtained with ￿xed-e￿ect estimation that there
is really a convergence to country speci￿c stationnary equilibrium between initial emigration rate and
growth.
The wage of physicians expressed in terms of the US physician wage is negative and signi￿cant at
10%. In other words, a doubling of salaries leads to a 2.3% reduction in the emigration of physicians.
Bhargava and Docquier (2008) have found similar results, with an elasticity close to -0.036. This result
supports the argument of Harris and Todaro (1970). They stipulate that migration is driven by the
14di￿erential between origin wage and the expected destination wage. This framework applies to physi-
cian migration decisions. More speci￿cally, Astor et al. (2005) developed a questionnaire in which they
asked questions about the motivation behind migration decisions for medical doctors. Their analysis
is foccused on 5 countries, namely, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Colombia and the Philippines. Overall,
90.8% of physicians are motivated by the desire for a higher income. Surprisingly, the robustness of
this variable is not very high in the GMM estimation (Table 3). This result supports the observation
expressed in Vujicic et al. (2004). In fact, they discussed the role of wages in two African countries,
namely, Ghana and South Africa. They observed that the wage premium (i.e., the ratio of the desti-
nation wage to the origin wage) is about 22 between Ghana and the US but is only 4 for South Africa.
They expected that medical worker emigration would be much lower in South Africa than in Ghana.
Surprisingly, the percentage of health care professionals who intend to migrate is quite similar (62% in
Ghana and 58% in South Africa). Vujicic et al. (2004) conclude that the correlation between the supply
of health care workers and the wage ratio is quite small. Thus, policies that consist of increasing the
source wage will not reduce the huge wage di￿erential enough to weaken the emigration rate of health
professionals.
The GDP per capita in the origin countries has a signi￿cant and negative impact on the physician
emigration rates. So migration is important in poor regions, typically Sub-Saharan Africa, as we have
seen in the descriptive statistics. When the GDP per capita is low, physicians have more incentives
to migrate. In the poorest countries, few people have the ability to migrate, both because the cost
of migration is too high as well as due to liquidity constraints. However, physicians are an upper
socio-professional occupation in developing countries both ￿nancially and educationally, and they can
easily sustain the migration cost. Moreover, in high-income countries, the working conditions are quite
good, for example, because of the presence of su￿cient medical drugs, equipment and high quality
infrastructure, which discourage physicians from migrating. In the survey from Astor et al. (2005),
74.1% of the respondents wanted access to better techonology and equipment through migration.
The percentage of enrollment in secondary school is positive and signi￿cant only at the 10% level.
In the context of higher education levels, physicians have more perspective to acquire medical training
and education at home or abroad. Nevertheless, in the other GMM estimations in Table 3, its signi￿-
cance level disappears.
Bhargava and Docquier (2008) have shown an impact of HIV prevalence rates on the decision of
physicians to migrate. This e￿ect is con￿rmed in our analysis, in which this variable appears with a
15robust positive and signi￿cant sign. In fact, a high HIV prevalence rate deteriorates the safety of care
and creates a high transmission risk for medical sta￿. Thus, the medical workforce has an additional
incentive to migrate. However, the coe￿cient of the variable di￿ers from that found in Bhargava and
Docquier (2008) at 0.08 in that study as compared to 0.024 in our case. This di￿erence can be explained
by the dependent variable, which di￿ers between our study and theirs. Here, we explain the change in
emigration rates between t and t-1, which has a signi￿cant e￿ect on the interpretation of our variable
and the size of the coe￿cient. Moreover, our estimation method is very di￿erent from theirs. Here,
we consider ￿xed-e￿ect and GMM estimations, whereas Bhargava and Docquier (2008) used a max-
imum likelihood estimation with random e￿ects. Finally, their analysis focuses only on Sub-Saharan
African countries, whereas our analysis is based on a worldwide dataset. In our case, a doubling of
HIV prevalence rate in the short term leads to an increase in the emigration rate between t and t-1 of
2.4%. For long-term equilibria, this e￿ect is close to 50%. In Vujicic et al. (2004), the same emigration
rate in South Africa and Ghana would be explained by the high proportion of HIV-infected people.
For them, better policies are those that improve the working and living conditions in the developing
source countries.
Finally, foreign health aid is introduced in column 2 and appears with a signi￿cant positive sign.
In other word, a country that is receiving more health aid from donors will see its emigration rate of
doctors become more important. This interpretation supports the analysis of Chauvet et al. (2008)
which explains the positive correlation between health aid and the physicians emigration rate by the
signi￿cant proportion of grants given to physicians for specialised training in OECD countries. This
type of aid improves the mobility of migrants, particularly physicians. It can change the expectation
of physicians at the end of their training, which creates incentives for them to stay in the destina-
tion country after their diploma and accelerates the emigration of health workers in the short term.
BerthØlØmy et al. (2008) have found a positive correlation between migration and aid using a bilateral
analysis. Foreign aid provides information through development assistance about the labour market
integration in host countries and increases the potential wages in origin countries, which can be seen
as an additional factor enabling doctors to obtain the cost of migration. This positive e￿ect have to
be interpreted with cautious because, with ￿xed e￿ect estimation, nothing is done to control for endo-
geneity bias. In column 3 of Table 2, we added the level of corruption; the health aid e￿ect remains
positive and signi￿cant. In column 4, the in￿ation rate is introduced at a non-signi￿cant level, but
health aid loses its signi￿cance. Nevertheless, the P-value is close to 10% at approximately 0.101.
Even though the ￿xed-e￿ect estimation controls for possible misspeci￿cations caused by unobserv-
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panels. Endogeneity problem results biased coe￿cients associated to health aid if reverse causality
occurs10. In our case, without controlling for endogeneity bias in ￿xed-e￿ect estimation, the coe￿cient
associated to health aid could be interpreted as the impact of aid on migration in health sector but
it could also be the e￿ect of migration on aid in health sector. Indeed, the health-related foreign aid
distribution could be in￿uenced by the out￿ows of physicians in recipient countries. This is what hap-
pened when humanitarian crisis is observed in developing countries. Since the causality in our study
is very important for interpretation, we have to correct endogeneity bias either by ￿nding new robust
instruments or by using GMM system strategy. In our analysis, GMM estimation has been preferred.
With GMM system estimation, the coe￿cient of health aid is negative and signi￿cant, which means
that health aid e￿ectively reduces the growth of physician emigrations rather than motivates it. This
conclusion is validated by the Hansen J test for the exogeneity of instruments. If we do not control for
endogeneity bias, health aid seems to increase the amount of migration, whereas it reduces it when we
take this problem into account. Moreover, the GMM estimation is better than ￿xed-e￿ect estimation,
because it also controls for the Nickell bias, since health aid and initial emigration rates are considered
as endogeneous, which is our case. The short-term elasticity devoted to health aid is -0.032. An
increase of 10% in health aid is associated with a reduction in emigration of around 0.32%. Typically,
in the short term, the direct impact of health assistance lies in activities that have an immediate e￿ect
such as the furnishing of medical tools or drugs. But in the long term, after the realisation of health
infrastructures such as hospitals and clinics, the impact of health assistance can be more important.
Known as the convergence estimator, the long-term e￿ect of health aid can be computed at about 0.42.
In other words, a doubling of health aid leads to a reduction in the growth of the physician emigration
rate of 42% in the long term. All these improvements in working conditions through the ￿nancing
of medical tools, equipment, or expertise for basic health care are captured by health aid and can be
viewed as a good tool for containing the medical brain drain. In columns 3 and 4, the level of corruption
and the in￿ation rate are introduced; they are not signi￿cant, but health aid remains signi￿cant and
negative.
5.2 Estimation with interaction terms
Debates in the literature on foreign aid have foccused on the impact of foreign aid on GDP growth. In
the eighties, Mosley et al. (1987) pointed out the ine￿ectiveness of foreign aid in developing recipient
10The potential ommited variable is less problematic in our case because we are in panel estimation which permits to
control for ￿xed country characteristics
17countries, concerning the release of the poverty trap and not providing su￿cient incentives for the
growth process. Foreign aid is also ine￿ective at increasing investment and improving human devel-
opment indicators (Boone (1996)). During the nineties, the amount of foreign aid remained constant
because of these pessimistic academic results as well as due to new restrictions in budgets and de￿cits,
as European countries were moving towards the adoption of a common currency. Around 2000, many
papers found that foreign aid could have a real impact on growth depending on the macroeconomic
policies adopted (Burnside and Dollar (2000), Dollar and Easterly (1999)) and the quality of institu-
tions involved in recipient countries (Dollar and Svensson (2000)). Even if the results are debatable,
the policy implications of these studies have had a large impact on the distribution of foreign aid. More
speci￿cally, in the health sector, Burnside and Dollar (1998) has examined the impact of foreign aid
on the child mortality rate. They show that foreign aid reduces mortality rates only in good policy
environments. Foreign aid has a negative e￿ect on mortality rates in the presence of low corruption,
high property rights, openned trading regimes and macroeconomic stability.
In this section, we try to follow this trend in the literature to explore under which conditions foreign
aid devoted to the health sector has more impact on the growth of physician emigration rates.
Table 4 presents GMM estimations with interaction terms for institutional quality and economic
performance. In column 1, corruption is introduced and interacted with our health aid variable. The
health aid variable loses its signi￿cance, while the interaction term with corruption gains signi￿cance,
although with a higher elasticity. In other words, health aid should be more e￿ective at reducing med-
ical emigration in countries in which the level of corruption is low. This con￿rms the ￿ndings in the
literature that indicate that foreign aid is more e￿ective in the presence of a good environment. The
coe￿cient of interaction is higher at -0.09 than the coe￿cient expressed for health aid only at -0.052.
The corruption level has a positive sign, meaning that in regions in which the level of corruption is
high, the emigration rates of physicians are low. One of the explanations is that in corrupt countries,
it is more di￿cult to obtain the necessary administrative papers or visas to move.
In columns 2 and 3, we investigate whether health aid is more e￿ective in countries with a strong
respect for the rule of law and more openness. This is not the case, and because of the multicolinearity
between the health aid variable and its interaction term, the health aid variable itself becomes insignif-
icant.
Finally, in column 4, we tested the same speci￿cation but with in￿ation growth rate. We found
18evidence that the interaction with health aid and in￿ation is signi￿cantly negative. Nevertheless, the
elasticity associated with the in￿ation interaction (-0.018) is below the coe￿cient previously associated
with health aid (-0.032) and much lower than the interaction with corruption (-0.089). If we compute
the long-term e￿ect, it is around 32%, as compared to 42% for the coe￿cient of health aid without
interaction. Thus, we can attribute this fall in aid e￿ectiveness to the presence of high in￿ation. The
evident colinearity between health aid and interaction with in￿ation causes the coe￿cient of health aid
itself to become unsigni￿cant. Notice that in￿ation itself becomes positive and signi￿cant, meaning
that in regions in which the in￿ation rate increase, the migration decisions of physicians also increase.
This analysis con￿rms that foreign aid in the medical sector should permit a substantial improvement
in working conditions and should improve the labour environment of doctors in the long term, primarily
in regions in which the levels of corruption and in￿ation are quite low.
6 Conclusions
The importance of the professional medical sta￿, in particular physicians, in achieving the Millenium
Development Goals in health outcomes is well established. Today, most low-income developing countries
su￿er from large de￿cits in the number of professional health workers. The Joint Learning Initiative
(JLI), which is a network of global health leaders, have established that a country with less than 2.5
health workers per 1000 people fails to achieve the 80% benchmarks for measles immunisation and for
skilled birth attendance (World Health Organisation (2006)). The policy implications for the control
of migration and aid ￿ows as well as the linkage between them are very complex and not easy to im-
plement (OCDE (2007)), even in the health sector.
Our analysis tries to investigate the link between foreign aid and migration in the health sector.
The health system requires both infrastructure and human resources such as doctors, nurses and others
specialists. Health ODA undeniably increases the health capital and infrastructure, it is not clear how
aid a￿ects human capital in the health sector. Our study seems to show that foreign health assistance
is a good tool for restraining doctor emigration through, probably, the improvement of working con-
ditions. Note that the magnitude of health elasticity is quite high in the long term. So increasing
health-related ODA by a small amount could substancially improve the retention of medical health
professionals. Health aid can play a major role in these improvements if the amount is regularly dis-
tributed. Reducing health aid would be disastrous for the advancement already accomplished during
the past several years and for the future achievement of the Millenium Development Goals adopted in
2000 for the health sector. Moreover, the e￿ectiveness of health aid seems to be higher in regions in
19which the levels of corruption and in￿ation are quite low. The good governance that is necessary for
aid seems to have a powerful e￿ect on the reduction of emigration in the health sector. It would thus
be a useful policy to require good government as a precondition for aid.
These ￿ndings con￿rm the e￿ciency of foreign health aid to weaken the vicious circle of brain drain
among physicians when governance is well run.
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23Table 2: Panel Fixed E￿ect Estimations for Medical emigration growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fixed e￿ect Fixed e￿ect Fixed e￿ect Fixed e￿ect
Ln(MBDit 1) -0.056** -0.162*** -0.135*** -0.240***
(0.026) (0.044) (0.043) (0.057)
Ln(Physicians   wages=USA   ratio)it 1 -0.023* -0.097** -0.059 -0.088**
(0.013) (0.041) (0.041) (0.045)
Ln(GDP   per   capita)it 1 -0.088** 0.036 -0.026 0.016
(0.038) (0.075) (0.085) (0.105)
Ln(School   enrollment   secondary)it 1 0.048* -0.010 0.010 -0.041
(0.025) (0.053) (0.043) (0.059)
Ln(HIV   prevalence   rate)it 1 0.024* 0.010 0.008 -0.008
(0.013) (0.031) (0.033) (0.036)
Ln(Aidi;t 1t 3) 0.016* 0.021** 0.016(*)
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)




Country Fixed e￿ect YES YES YES YES
Time ￿xed e￿ect YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.360 -1.531*** -0.150 -1.800**
(0.416) (0.572) (0.796) (0.740)
Number of group 85 60 47 55
Observations 897 368 293 305
R-squared 0.27 0.48 0.54 0.57
Notes:(i.)Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.)(*) closed to signi￿cant at 10% * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
In all estimation the dependant variable is Ln(MBDit=MBDit 1).
24Table 3: System GMM Estimation for Medical emigration growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
System GMM System GMM System GMM System GMM
Ln(MBDit 1) -0.043 -0.076* -0.070** -0.058
(0.032) (0.039) (0.031) (0.038)
Ln(Physicians   wages=USA   ratio)it 1 0.011 0.028 0.013 0.021
(0.010) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Ln(GDP   per   capita)it 1 -0.0293*** -0.051* -0.077** -0.070**
(0.010) (0.026) (0.030) (0.028)
Ln(School   enrollment   secondary)it 1 0.046*** 0.050 0.046 0.056*
(0.016) (0.035) (0.038) (0.032)
Ln(HIV   prevalence   rate)it 1 0.021*** 0.037** 0.035** 0.027*
(0.007) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014)
Ln(Aidi;t 1t 3) -0.032* -0.052** -0.044***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.014)




Constant 0.059 0.218 0.391 0.426**
(0.084) (0.216) (0.309) (0.188)
Country Fixed e￿ect YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed e￿ect YES YES YES YES
AR(1) Test 0,000 0,006 0,016 0,012
AR(2) Test 0.471 0,818 0,127 0,692
Hansen J Test 0.308 0,605 0,492 0,233
Number of instruments 79 57 48 48
Number of groups 85 60 47 55
Observations 897 368 293 305
Notes:(i.)Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.)* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
In all estimation the dependant variable is Ln(MBDit=MBDit 1).
25Table 4: System GMM Estimation with Macroeconomic Policy and Institution Quality Interaction
Terms for Medical emigration growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
System GMM System GMM System GMM System GMM
Ln(MBDit 1) -0.040* -0.103** -0.042* -0.056*
(0.021) (0.048) (0.024) (0.031)
Ln(Physicians   wages=USA   ratio)it 1 0.002 0.038 0.019* 0.022
(0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.017)
Ln(GDP   per   capita)it 1 -0.046** -0.055* -0.050*** -0.075***
(0.018) (0.030) (0.017) (0.024)
Ln(School   enrollment   secondary)it 1 0.034 0.063 0.045* 0.065**
(0.025) (0.043) (0.024) (0.027)
Ln(HIV   prevalence   rate)it 1 0.024** 0.046** 0.022* 0.031**
(0.010) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012)
Ln(Aidi;t 1t 3) 0.087 -0.005 -0.061 -0.012
(0.064) (0.040) (0.095) (0.019)
Ln(Low   Corruption)it 1 0.313**
(0.142)
Ln(Low   Corruption)it 1  Ln(Aidi;t 1t 3) -0.089*
(0.052)
Ln(Law   and   Order)it 1 0.014
(0.053)
Ln(Law   and   Order)it 1  Ln(Aidi;t 1t 3) -0.013
(0.022)
Ln(Trade   Openess)it 1 -0.040
(0.067)




Ln(Inflation)it;t 1  Ln(Aidi;t 1t 3) -0.018**
(0.007)
Constant -0.136 0.114 0.427 0.350*
(0.268) (0.279) (0.297) (0.194)
Country Fixed E￿ect YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed E￿ect YES YES YES YES
AR(1) Test 0,010 0.007 0.005 0,008
AR(2) Test 0,203 0.155 0.922 0,894
Hansen J test 0,484 0.358 0.461 0,322
Number of instruments 49 49 49 49
Number of group(code) 47 60 59 55
Observations 293 343 350 305
Notes:(i.)Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.)* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%.
In all estimation the dependant variable is Ln(MBDit=MBDit 1).
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